The Effects of Cartelization on Product Design by Haan, Marco A. & Toolsema, Linda A.
  
 University of Groningen
The Effects of Cartelization on Product Design
Haan, Marco A.; Toolsema, Linda A.
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2005
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Haan, M. A., & Toolsema, L. A. (2005). The Effects of Cartelization on Product Design. s.n.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
The Eﬀects of Cartelization on Product Design
Marco A. Haan Linda A. Toolsema∗
December 31, 2004
Abstract
We consider the following model. First, two firms choose locations on a Hotelling
line. Second, they play a repeated price-setting game, in which they may be able
to collude. Transportation costs are quadratic. We show that if firms collude in the
location stage, they choose locations that coincide with the social optimum, provided
that the discount factor is high enough. If the discount factor is lower, the firms locate
further apart. Furthermore, we show that if firms choose locations non-cooperatively,
they both locate in the middle of the line, again provided that the discount factor
is high enough. If the discount factor is lower, the firms locate further apart. Thus,
with the possibility of a price cartel and a discount rate that is suﬃciently high,
Hotelling’s principle of minimum diﬀerentiation is restored.
jel Classification Codes: D43; L13; L41.
Keywords: Collusion; Product diﬀerentiation.
1 Introduction
In a seminal paper, Hotelling (1929) argued that firms tend to supply products that bear a
close resemblance to each other. Hotelling considered a two-stage duopoly model in which
consumers are uniformly distributed on a line of unit length, and firms first choose locations
and then set prices. Using linear transportation costs for consumers, he solved for the
∗Both authors: Department of Economics, University of Groningen, P.O.Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen,
The Netherlands. E-mail: m.a.haan@eco.rug.nl, l.a.toolsema@eco.rug.nl. The authors thank seminar
participants at the University of Groningen for useful comments.
subgame perfect equilibrium1 of this game and concluded that both firms choose to locate
exactly in the middle of the line. Firms thus choose to produce identical products. This
result was coined the principle of minimum diﬀerentiation by Boulding (1966). Hotelling
argued that this principle readily follows from casual observation as well:
”Buyers are confronted everywhere with an excessive sameness. [...] The
tremendous standardisation of our furniture, our houses, our clothing, our au-
tomobiles and our education we due in part to the economies of large-scale
production, in part to fashion and imitation. But over and above these forces
is [...] the tendency to make only slight deviations in order to have for the new
commodity as many buyers of the old as possible, to get, so to speak, between
one’s competitors and a mass of customers.” (Hotelling 1929, pp. 54).
Exactly 50 years later, however, d’Aspremont et al. (1979) noted that there is a mistake
in Hotelling’s analysis. When locations are relatively close, a pure strategy equilibrium in
prices does not exist. Firms then have an incentive to undercut their rival and capture
the entire market, a possibility that Hotelling did not take into account.2 To be able to
find a clear-cut solution, these authors employ quadratic rather than linear transportation
costs. Yet, under this assumption, they find that firms choose to locate at the endpoints
of the line. Hence, we have maximum rather than minimum diﬀerentiation. This not only
contradicts Hotelling’s analysis, but also his casual observation.
1Although, of course, the concept of subgame perfectness was only introduced almost half a century
later (Selten, 1975).
2For a more technical discussion regarding the exact reason as to why an equilibrium in pure strategies
in the price-setting stage of Hotelling’s model does not always exist, see e.g. Economides (1984).
2
These models, and most of the subsequent literature, do assume however that firms will
compete in prices after locations have been chosen. We introduce the possibility of a cartel
to be formed after the location stage. In our model, we use quadratic transportation costs.
Firms first choose locations, and then play a repeated price setting game. We show that
when firms choose locations noncooperatively, the principle of minimum diﬀerentiation
re-emerges, provided that the discount factor is high enough. Interestingly, this seems to
imply that if Hotelling’s casual observation was correct, we may conclude that the markets
he referred to could be characterized as being collusive rather than competitive.
Admittedly, our paper is not the first to study the possibility of tacit collusion in a
Hotelling framework. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study how
the possibility of collusion aﬀects the irreversible location choices of two firms that choose
those locations noncooperatively. Chang (1991) and Ross (1992) study the stability of price
collusion in the Hotelling model for given locations. They use quadratic transportation
costs and delivered pricing, and employ grim trigger strategies. Hence, in these models, in
equilibrium a firm sticks to an implicit cartel agreement if and only if both firms have always
done so in the past. Ha¨ckner (1996) analyzes a similar model, but instead uses optimal
punishment strategies in the sense of Abreu (1986). The case of linear transportation costs
is studied by Rath (1998). Gupta and Venkatu (2002) use delivered pricing rather than
mill pricing. A few papers endogenize the choice of location or product design. Ha¨ckner
(1995) does so in a framework where firms can redesign in every period at negligible costs.
In Chang (1992), relocation may also occur in every period, but in his model relocation is
costly. The paper that perhaps is closest to ours is Gill (2002). In his model, firms make
3
an irreversible location choice at the beginning of the game, as they do in our model. Yet,
Gill only considers the collusive location choice when a repeated price setting game follows.
He does not consider noncollusive location choices, which is the main contribution of our
paper.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe our
model. Section 3 solves for the case in which firms explicitly collude in the location stage.
This model merely serves as a benchmark that aides in the analysis of section 4. There,
we consider the case of noncooperative location choices. We consider this to be the more
interesting case; as location is a one-shot decision, it is not possible to tacitly collude in
location choices, whereas it may be possible to tacitly collude in the price-setting stage.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Our model has two stages. In the first stage, which we denote as τ = 0, two firms choose
locations on a Hotelling line of unit length. We denote the location of firm 1 by a1, and
that of firm 2 by 1 − a2, with a1, a2 ∈ [0, 1]. Without loss of generality, we assume that
firm 1 is located to the left of firm 2, so 1−a1−a2 ≥ 0. In the case of symmetric locations,
we will write a1 = a2 = a. In our model, location choices are irreversible. We thus assume
that once a firm has chosen a location, or more generally, once a firm has designed its
product, it becomes prohibitively expensive to change that design.
Consumers are uniformly distributed along the line and have unit demand. The firms
(and their products) are ex ante identical. Transportation costs are quadratic: a consumer
4
located at x who chooses to buy from a firm located at a incurs transportation costs that
equal t(x − a)2. Marginal costs of production are denoted c, and are constant and equal
among firms. The consumers’ willingness-to-pay for the product equals v. We assume
that v is suﬃciently high, such that the market is always covered. For our purposes, it is
suﬃcient to have v > c+ 4t.
The second stage of the model is an infinitely repeated price-setting game, and consists
of the periods τ = 1, . . . ,∞. Firms employ a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). The price
set by firm i in period τ is denoted piτ . The profits of firm i in period τ are denoted
πi(p1τ , p2τ ; a1, a2). Where this cannot yield confusion, we will often drop arguments and
subscripts. The indiﬀerent consumer is now located at z implicitly given by





(a1 + 1− a2) +
p2 − p1
2t (1− a1 − a2)
. (1)
Firm profits are given by
π1(p1, p2; a1, a2) = z (p1 − c) ,
π2(p1, p2; a1, a2) = (1− z) (p2 − c) . (2)
For the price setting stage, we use the canonical tacit collusion model with grim trigger
strategies (see e.g. Tirole 1988, pp. 245-6). Thus, if there is an implicit cartel agreement,
a firm sticks to that agreement if and only if both firms have always done so in the past.
Otherwise, both firms will choose to compete forever.
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For the collusive agreement, we assume that firms choose prices that maximize joint
profits. Thus, tacit collusion has firms setting monopoly prices pm1 and p
m
2 with
{pm1 (a1, a2), pm2 (a1, a2)} ∈ argmaxp1,p2 {π1 (p1, p2; a1, a2) + π2(p1, p2; a1, a2)} . (3)
Denote the per-period profits of firm i of sticking to this cartel agreement, and given the
locations, as πki . In what follows, we will show that, given a1 and a2, the prices p
m
1 and
pm2 are uniquely determined. We can thus write π
k
i (a1, a2) ≡ πi(pm1 (a1, a2), pm2 (a1, a2)).
Competitive profits are denoted by πci (a1, a2). The maximum one-shot profits a firm can
earn when defecting from the collusive agreement are denoted πdi (a1, a2). Firm i will thus
stick to the cartel agreement if and only if
δ ≥ π
d
i (a1, a2)− πki (a1, a2)
πdi (a1, a2)− πci (a1, a2)
≡ δ∗i (a1, a2). (4)
When this condition is satisfied for both firm 1 and firm 2, we have a stable cartel. We
refer to such a cartel as one of full collusion. We thus have
Definition 1 A fully collusive outcome consists of the prices (pm1 , p
m
2 ) that satisfy (3). A
cartel with full collusion is stable if (4) is satisfied for i = 1, 2.
Yet, even when a cartel with full collusion is not stable, we may still have a stable
cartel, but one at prices that do not maximize joint per-period profits. We will refer to
such a situation as one of constrained collusion. The one-shot profits a firm can earn at
most when defecting from the agreement are denoted πdi (p1, p2, a1, a2). Firm i will stick to




i (p1, p2; a1, a2)− πi(p1, p2; a1, a2)
πdi (p1, p2; a1, a2)− πci (a1, a2)
. (5)
We thus have
Definition 2 There is a constrained collusive outcome if full collusion is not a stable cartel,
but there is some (p˜1, p˜2) such that (5) is satisfied for i = 1, 2, and moreover πi (p˜1, p˜2) > π
c
i
for i = 1, 2.
As a benchmark, we will first solve our model for the case in which firms explicitly
collude in the location stage. Then, taking the analysis of collusion in the location stage
as a starting point, we solve our model for the case in which locations are chosen nonco-
operatively. Throughout our analysis, we will restrict attention to symmetric equilibria.
For ease of exposition, we will write profits as a function of a in cases where locations
are symmetric. For example, we will write πki (a) rather than π
k
i (a1, a2) for cases in which
a1 = a2 = a.
3 Model I: Collusion in the location stage
We first solve for the case in which firms choose their locations cooperatively. Hence, apart
from tacit collusion in the repeated price-setting stage, we assume here that there is also
explicit collusion in the location stage. Firms then choose locations as to maximize their
profits in the price-setting game that follows.
We proceed as follows. First, for given symmetric locations a, we derive the competitive
outcome, which allows us to determine πc(a). Second, we solve for the fully collusive cartel
7
prices (pm1 , p
m
2 ). Then we derive the optimal defection from that cartel. This allows us to
derive the cartel stability condition. Finally, given these results, we solve for the symmetric
location a that maximizes joint profits, while also taking into account the possibility of
constrained collusion.
Competitive outcome Suppose that firms are located at a and 1−a, with 0 ≤ a ≤ 1/2.
We look for the competitive equilibrium prices pc1(a) and p
c
2(a). From (1), the indiﬀerent






2t (1− 2a) . (6)
Again, firm 1’s profits are given by z (p1 − c) and firm 2’s profits by (1− z) (p2 − c). Taking




(c+ pj + t (1− 2a)) . (7)
Imposing symmetry yields





t (1− 2a) . (8)
Full collusion We now solve for fully collusive prices in the case of symmetric locations.
First note that we have eﬀectively assumed that v is large enough such that firms always
choose to cover the entire market. In the case of full collusion with symmetric locations,
firms will thus choose identical prices that are as high as possible, but are such that all
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consumers on the line are still willing to buy. Here, this implies that consumers located
at the endpoints as well as consumers located in the middle are just willing to buy. Firms
will thus set







This can be seen as follows. Suppose that firms are located at some a ≥ 1/4. That is,
they are closer the middle of the line than they are to an endpoint of it. In that case, if
firms set a price such that the consumer located at the endpoint is willing to buy, then
consumers located in the middle are willing to buy as well, as their transportation costs
are lower. Hence, the profit-maximizing price then is p = v − ta2. Now suppose that firms
are located at some a < 1/4. In that case, they are closer to the endpoints than they are
to the middle of the line. Now, if they set a price such that consumers in the middle are
just willing to buy, then the consumers located at the endpoint are willing to buy as well.
This involves setting a price p = v − t(1
2
− a)2.














Optimal defection Now suppose that a firm defects from the tacit cartel agreement
derived above. Without loss of generality, assume that this is firm 1. A defecting firm will
always set a price such that he just captures the entire market, i.e. that the consumer at
the opposite endpoint of the line just prefers purchasing from the defecting firm.3 This
3Suppose this is not the case. The optimal reply to the collusive price set by firm 2 can be found by
plugging pm2 from (9) into the reaction function (7). But this is only the best reply if it yields z ≤ 1, with
z as defined in (6). Otherwise, we have a corner solution, and the best reply for firm 1 is indeed to set a
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implies setting a price pdi such that




j − t (1− 2a) . (11)
The profits from this defection are





































≡ δ∗ (a) . (13)
Note that δ∗ (a) is continuous and diﬀerentiable for all a ∈ [0, 1
2






4 (v − c) + t (1− 2a)2
(4 (v − c)− t (1− 2a) (7− 2a))2
> 0.






v − c− ta (1− a)
(2v − 2c− t (3− 6a+ 2a2))2
> 0.
Hence, δ∗(a) is strictly increasing in a, which implies that the cartel becomes less stable as
firms move closer.4 Intuitively, as firms move closer, it becomes easier to undercut one’s




pm2 − c− t (1− 2a)
4t (1− 2a) .
We thus have that pd1 as defined above is not an admissible solution if this z is larger than 1, or pm2 >
c+ 3t (1− 2a) . Using our assumption that v > c+ 4t, this will always prove to be the case.
4Note that lima↑ 14
∂δ∗(a)
∂a < lima↓ 14
∂δ∗(a)
∂a . Hence the derivative has a discontinuous increase at a =
1
4 ,
which implies that δ∗ is kinked at that point. This, however, has no eﬀect for our analysis.
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rival, as the amount by which one has to undercut ones rival in order to capture the entire
market is now lower. This makes defecting from a cartel more attractive as firms move
closer, and hence makes a cartel less stable.
Location choice We now solve for the collusive location choice of both firms. First,
consider the case in which the condition for cartel stability is always satisfied with full
collusion. Firms will then simply choose the location that maximizes cartel profits, as
given by (10). It is easy to see that this yields locations a = 1/4. But now suppose that
δ < δ∗(1/4).With δ∗(a) increasing in a, the firms may still be able to achieve full collusion
– but only at a lower value of a. Alternatively, firms can also choose to still locate at
a = 1/4 (or any other location, for that matter) and settle for a cartel with constrained
collusion. However, we can show that firms will always strictly prefer to locate where full
collusion is still stable. We thus have the following result:
Theorem 1 In the model with collusion in the location stage, the equilibrium location





0 if δ ≤ δ∗ (0) ,














with a∗ the unique solution of δ = δ∗ (a).
Proof. The case δ ≥ δ∗(1/4) follows from the discussion above. For the other cases,
suppose that firms locate at some a where full collusion is not stable. Rewriting (5), we
can still have constrained collusion at symmetric prices p when
(1− δ)πdi (p; a) < πki (p; a)− δπci (a),
11




From (8), we have πci (a) =
1
2
(1− 2a) t. Initially, we assume that defecting entails capturing
the entire market. If that is the case we have using (11) that pdi = p − t (1− 2a) , so
πdi (p; a) = p− t (1− 2a)− c. Using these expressions, the inequality above reduces to
(1− 2δ) p < (2− 3δ) (1− 2a) t+ (1− 2δ) c.
Note from (13) that δ∗(1/2) = 1
2
. With δ∗ increasing, we have that δ < δ∗(1/4) implies
δ < 1/2. We can thus rewrite the inequality above as
p < c+
2− 3δ
1− 2δ (1− 2a) t. (14)
As the fraction is strictly positive for δ < 1/2, the upper bound on p is decreasing in a,
which implies that the highest possible constrained cartel profit is decreasing in a. Hence
when δ = δ∗(a) at some a∗ < 1/4, then the result implies that maximum cartel profits
are increasing in a for a ≤ a∗ (where full collusion is still stable) and decreasing in a for
a > a∗ (where only constrained collusion is feasible). Hence, firms will choose to locate at
a∗. This establishes the theorem.
Interestingly, we thus have that when cartel stability is not an issue, firms choose
locations that are socially optimal. Since the market is covered, prices paid by consumers
to firms are just tranfers that do not aﬀect total welfare. Maximizing welfare then entails
minimizing total transportation costs – which indeed implies having firms located at 1/4
and 3/4. In this set-up, we thus have that full collusion, in both locations and prices, yields
the best possible outcome from a welfare point of view.
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Of course, this policy conclusion is hard to swallow. Indeed, it is largely driven by one
peculiar feature of the Hotelling model. Diﬀerent from most other competition models,
firms with monopoly power do not restrict output in the Hotelling model, which implies
that there is no welfare loss from monopoly power. In our model, firms that collude in both
stages of the game have an incentive to choose locations such that total transportation costs
are as low as possible. The lower the transportation costs that consumers have, the higher
the price that the cartel can charge. Hence, in the location stage our collusive duopoly has
the exact same incentive as a social planner has.
4 Model II: Noncooperative location choices
We now solve the model for noncooperative location choices. To do so, we generalize our
model and also consider asymmetric locations a1 and a2, where a1 ≤ 1− a2. This section
is structured along the same lines as the previous one. We first solve for the competitive
outcome, then for full collusion. We then solve for the optimal defection and finally we
derive the equilibrium of the location stage.




(ai + 1− aj) +
pj − 2pi + c
2t (1− ai − aj)
= 0,
Solving this system of two equations for prices we find the competitive outcome




















(3 + ai − aj)2 (1− ai − aj) t. (15)
Full collusion Now consider a joint-profit-maximizing cartel. Again, profit maximiza-
tion requires that all consumers are served. Naturally, any profit-maximizing cartel has
both firms serving their own ”backyard”. That is, firm 1 will serve any consumer that is
located in the interval [0, a1], whereas firm 2 will serve any consumer located in [1− a2, 1].
To induce all these consumers to buy, both firms have to set a price that is such that the
consumer located at the closest endpoint is just willing to buy. Thus
pi = v − a2i t. (16)
Given these prices, any consumer located in [0, 2a1] is willing to buy from firm 1, whereas
any consumer located in [0, 1−2a2] is willing to buy from firm 2. Hence, with 2a1 ≥ 1−2a2
the entire market is covered at these prices. Therefore, these prices maximize joint profits.






v − ta2i − c
1− ai − aj
We refer to this situation as case I.
Now suppose that the entire market is not covered at prices (16), so we have 2a1 < 1−
2a2. The jointly profit-maximizing solution then has one or both firms setting a lower price.
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The profit-maximizing choice of prices now boils down to a profit-maximizing division of
the market. That is, firms have to decide on some location x ∈ [2a1, 1 − 2a2]. They will
both set a price that is such that the consumer located at x is just willing to buy. They
will then set x such that joint profits are maximized. This implies
p1 = v − t (x− a1)2 ,
p2 = v − t (1− a2 − x)2 . (17)
Joint profits can be written
π = (p1 − c)x+ (p2 − c) (1− x)
= v − t (x− a1)2 x− t (1− a2 − x)2 (1− x)− c.
Taking the derivative with respect to x yields
∂π
∂x
= 3 (1− 2x) + 4a1x− 4a2 (1− x) + a22 − a21.




3− 4a2 − a21 + a22
3− 2a1 − 2a2
. (18)
Two cases can now occur. First, we may have that xˆ as defined above falls strictly
within the interval [2a1, 1−2a2]. If that is the case, then (17) are the prices that maximize
joint profits. Both firms now set a price that is lower than the price such that their backyard
is just served. We refer to this as case II. Second, we may have that the constrained x as
defined in (18) is outside the admissible interval. Suppose that xˆ < 2a1. Given that profits
are strictly concave in x, joint profits are then maximized by setting x = 2a1. Hence, firm
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1 sets a price such that its backyard is just served, whereas firm 2 sets a price such that
the remainder of the market is just covered. Naturally, with xˆ > 1−2a2, we have the exact
opposite. It is then profit-maximizing to set x = 1− 2a2: firm 2 just covers its backyard,
whereas firm 1 serves the remainder of the market. These cases are just mirror images of
each other. We refer to them as case III. More precisely, we refer to the first as case IIIa,
and to the second as case IIIb. Summing up, using the definition of xˆ yields the following
areas in (a1, a2)−space:
• In area I we have 2a1 > 1− 2a2;









(15− 20a2 + 9a22) < a1 < 1− a2/2;









(15− 20a1 + 9a21) < a2 < 1− a1/2;








– INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE –
We have depicted the diﬀerent areas in figure 1. We now have:
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Result 1 With asymmetric locations, the fully collusive prices (pm1 (a1, a2), p
m








(v − ta21, v − ta22) in area I¡
v − t (xˆ− a1)2 , v − t (1− a2 − xˆ)2
¢
in area II¡
v − ta21, v − t (1− a2 − 2a1)
2¢ in area IIIa¡




Fully collusive profits (πk1(a1, a2), π
k































2a1 (v − ta21 − c) , (1− 2a1)
¡





v − t (1− a1 − 2a2)2 − c
¢
, 2a2 (v − ta22 − c)
¢
in area IIIb.
In these expressions, xˆ is given by (18), and the areas are as defined above.
Optimal defection Now consider the optimal defection from a fully collusive agreement.





j − t(1− ai)2. (20)
Profits from defecting equal
πdi = p
d
i − c = pkj + ta2j − t(1− ai)2 − c. (21)
For ease of exposition, and without loss of generality, we only consider the incentive that
firm 1 has to defect.





v − t (1− ai)2 − c in areas I and IIIa
v − t (1− a2 − xˆ)2 − t(1− a1)2 − c in area II
v − t (1− 2a2 − a1)2 + ta21 − t (1− a2)
2 − c in area IIIb.
5See footnote 3.
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Location stage For the case of asymmetric locations, we refrain from explicitly deriving
the cartel stability condition for all possible cases; this yields particularly nasty expressions,
and is not necessary in what follows. We look for a symmetric equilibrium in the location
stage. Thus, we look for symmetric locations (a1, a2) = (a, a) which are such that no firm
has an incentive to defect to some other location. We can therefore draw heavily on the
analysis in section 3.








. Then the unique symmetric equilibrium has a = 1
2
, that is, we have minimum
diﬀerentiation.
















v − c+ a1t (2− a1 − 2a2)
(1− a1 − a2)2
¸
> 0.
Hence, provided that this will still yield a stable cartel in the price-setting stage, firm 1
wants to defect from this candidate equilibrium by choosing a location closer to the middle.
Hence, this is not a Nash equilibrium in locations. Now consider a symmetric candidate
equilibrium with a < 1
4





2 + (3− 4a2 − 3a1)
(3− 2a1 − 2a2)2
> 0
as a1, a2 <
1
4





v − t (xˆ− a1)2 − c
¢ ∂xˆ
∂a1
+ 2t (xˆ− a1) xˆ > 0.
18
Again, firm 1 wants to defect from this candidate equilibrium by choosing a location closer
to the middle. The only possible symmetric equilibrium thus has a = 1/2. To see that this
is indeed an equilibrium, note from figure 1 that any defection of one firm from a = 1/2
implies that the firms end up in area I. But we already showed that within area I a firm’s
cartel profits are increasing in its location. Hence any defection from a = 1/2 yields lower
cartel profits.
With a high enough discount factor, we thus have that the principle of minimum dif-
ferentiation re-emerges. In that case, when firms make an irreversible location choice, and
then play a repeated price-setting game, they choose to locate as close as possible – as
Hotelling (1929) claimed in his analysis of the one-shot case.
Now consider the case in which the full cartel is not stable at a = 1/2 , but it is at some
a < 1/2. Denote the highest a for which this holds as a∗. Note that δ∗(1/2) = 1/2. Hence,
we must have δ < 1/2. The analysis now becomes much more involved. In the appendix
we prove the following result:
Theorem 3 In the model with noncooperative location stages, the equilibrium location





0 if δ ≤ δ∗ (0) ,














with a∗ the unique solution of δ = δ∗ (a).
Hence, both firms locate in the middle, provided that full collusion then yields a stable
cartel. If that is the case, both firms choosing socially optimal locations is no longer an
19
equilibrium. Both firms have an incentive to locate closer to the middle, as this yields
higher collusive profits for the defecting firm. The choice of locations is then a prisoners’
dilemma. Now suppose that full collusion with firms located in the middle no longer
constitutes a stable cartel. Consider the case where both firms are located such that a
cartel with full collusion is just stable. Defecting towards the middle then implies that
full collusion is no longer a stable cartel for the other firm. To restore cartel stability, the
defecting firm has to give up so much profits that the defection is not profitable.
Interestingly, we have that if δ > δ∗(1/4), firms are strictly better oﬀ when the discount
factor δ decreases to some δ˜ ∈ [δ∗ (1/4) , δ). Such a decrease would commit firms to locate
further apart, which increases equilibrium profits of both. In the standard cartel model, a
decrease in δ can never benefit firms, as it can only weaken cartel stability.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we revisited Hotelling’s (1929) claim that firms will choose to design products
in such a manner that they resemble each other as closely as possible. By now, it has been
widely established that in Hotelling’s original specification with linear transportation costs
this claim does not hold true. With quadratic transportation costs, competing firms will
even choose to design products in such a manner that they resemble each other as little as
possible. In our model, we studied the case in which firms make an irreversible location
choice, but then play a repeated price-setting game in which they may collude. Most
importantly, we showed that if firms are suﬃciently patient Hotelling’s original claim holds
true. When firms are able to collude in prices, they will choose to design products in
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such a manner that they resemble each other as closely as possible. When collusion is
more diﬃcult to sustain, firms will choose locations that are further apart, such that full
collusion is just stable. We also showed that if firms are able to collude in the location stage
as well, they will select the socially optimal locations, again provided that the discount
factor is high enough.
Our results have implications for competition policy. When product design is endoge-
nous, our results suggest that antitrust agencies should monitor more closely those in-
dustries where products are close substitutes. To paraphrase Hotelling (1929), whenever
buyers are confronted with an excessive sameness, this may be due in part to the economies
of large-scale production, in part to fashion and imitation. But over and above these forces
is the tendency to try to capture cartel profits that are as high as possible.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3
For the analysis that follows, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 1 For given a1 and a2, the cartel stability condition for firm 2 is relaxed if p1
increases or if p2 decreases, provided that p1 and p2 are such that both firms have a strictly
positive market share, and that p1, p2 > t.
Proof. For given a1 and a2, and dropping the arguments referring to locations, the
cartel stability condition for firm 2 can be written
(1− δ) πd2 − π2 (p1, p2) < −δπc2. (22)
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(1− δ)πd2 − π2 (p1, p2)
¢
∂p1
= (1− δ)− p2
2t (1− a1 − a2)
.
This expression is negative iﬀ p2 > 2t (1− a1 − a2) (1− δ) . The condition that both firms
have positive market share requires that z < 1. From (1) this implies
p2
2t (1− a1 − a2)
<
p1
2t (1− a1 − a2)
− 1
2
(a1 + 1− a2) + 1.
This implies that indeed p2 > 2t (1− a1 − a2) (1− δ) if
p1
2t (1− a1 − a2)
− 1
2
(a1 + 1− a2) + 1 > 1− δ,
which simplifies to
p1 > t (1− a1 − a2) (a1 − a2 + 1− 2δ) ,
which is always satisfied if p1 > t. Hence, increasing p1 indeed relaxes (22). Similarly
∂
¡





(1 + a2 − a1)−
p1 − 2p2
2t (1− a1 − a2)
This expression is positive iﬀ 2p2 > p1+t (1− a1 − a2) (1 + a2 − a1) . But given that p1 > t
and a1, a2 ≤ 12 , suﬃcient for this to hold is that 2p2 > 2t, which is always satisfied since
p2 > t. The result stated in the lemma then holds true.
Note that the restriction that prices have to exceed t is mild: with firms located at the
endpoints, the competitive price has p = c+ t. It will be easy to see that, for our purposes,
the constraint is never binding. We can now establish:
Lemma 2 If 1/2 > a∗ ≥ 1/4, defecting from (a∗, a∗) to some a˜ > a∗ yields lower cartel
profits for the defector than sticking to (a∗, a∗).
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Proof. Denote full collusion prices at (a∗, a∗) as (p∗, p∗). By construction, the cartel is
just stable at (a∗, a∗) and (p∗, p∗). Consider a defection to some a˜ > a∗ by firm 1. Since
a∗ > 1/4, the original situation had both firms just covering their backyard. Eﬃciency
requires that, in the new situation, firm 1 at least serves its backyard as well. Hence the
highest possible price firm 1 will set now equals
p˜1 = v − a˜2t.
Cartel stability for firm 2 requires
(1− δ)πd2 (p1, p2; a1, a2) ≤ π2 (p1, p2; a1, a2)− δπc2 (a1, a2) . (23)






+ 2a1t = 0.
Hence, the lhs of (23) is unaﬀected if a1 increases. We now consider the eﬀect on the
rhs. Take the prices (p∗, p∗) as a starting point. Consider the direct eﬀect of the change
in a1 on the cartel profits of firm 2, while keeping prices constant. From (2), we then have:
∂π2 (p




(p∗ − c) .





t (3 + a2 − a1) (5− 3a1 + a2)
Note that this expression is always negative, but strictly bigger than −t. Also note that






. Hence, with v > c + 4t, we necessarily have that the rhs of (23) is
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decreasing in a1 – even without taking into account that p1 will decrease as well, which
lowers π2 even further. Hence, at prices (p˜1, p
∗) the cartel is not stable for firm 2. To
achieve cartel stability for firm 2, we need to increase p1, or to decrease p2. Increasing p1
cannot be eﬃcient, as it implies firm 1’s backyard is no longer fully covered. Necessarily,
we thus need to decrease p2. By construction, we had
π2 (p
∗; a∗) = (1− δ)πd2 (p∗; a∗) + δπc2 (a∗)
Since πc2 is decreasing in a1, while π
d
2 is unaﬀected, for cartel stability for firm 2 we need,
using (23), that p˜2 decreases so much that
π2(p˜1, p˜2; a˜, a
∗) > π2 (p
∗; a∗) .
Firm 2 thus needs to achieve higher profits with a lower price. That implies that its
market share has to increase. In turn this implies that the market share of firm 1 has to
decrease. Since firm 1 also sets a lower price, the defection necessarily lowers its profits,
which establishes the result.
We also have:
Lemma 3 In the case that a∗ < 1/4, defecting from (a∗, a∗) to some a˜ > a∗ yields lower
cartel profits for the defector than sticking to (a∗, a∗).
Proof. Denote full cartel prices at (a∗, a∗) as (p∗, p∗). By construction, the cartel is just
stable at (a∗, a∗) and (p∗, p∗). Consider a cartel at locations (a˜, a∗). This needs to satisfy
π2 (p˜1, p˜2; a˜, a
∗) ≥ (1− δ)πd2 (p˜1, p˜2; a˜, a∗) + δπc2 (a˜, a∗) . (24)
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Consider the case in which p˜1 = p˜2 = p




(1− δ) πd2 + δπc2
¢
= (1− δ) 2t (1− a1)−
δ
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t (a2 − a1 + 3) (5− 3a1 − a2) .
It can be shown that this expression is decreasing in δ, a1 and a2. The lowest possible
value is thus reached for δ = 1/2, and a1 = a2 = 1/4. In that case, the expression
simplifies to 5t/12. Hence, we have that the rhs of (24) is always increasing in a1. Combined
with the fact that we already established that ∂π2/∂a1 < 0, this implies that at prices
(p∗, p∗) and locations (a˜, a∗), the cartel is no longer stable. It also implies that necessarily
π2 (p˜1, p˜2; a˜, a
∗) > π2 (p
∗, p∗; a∗, a∗) . Denote the indiﬀerent consumer at the constrained
cartel as z˜. For cartel stability for firm 2, we thus need that (p˜2 − c)(1 − z˜) > 12(p∗2 − c).
There are two ways to achieve this. The first is to increase p1. This hurts firm 1, as its
profits are decreasing in p1 at (p
∗, p∗). The second is to decrease p2. However, as we need
(p˜2−c)(1− z˜) > 12(p∗2−c), this implies that we need z˜ < 1/2. In that case, the market share
of firm 1 decreases, whereas its price does not change. Hence, also in that case, profits of
firm 1 decrease.
The final lemma we need to establish our result is the following:
Lemma 4 In the case that a∗ < 1/2, defecting from (a∗, a∗) to some a˜ < a∗ yields lower
cartel profits for the defector than sticking to (a∗, a∗).
Proof. By construction, the cartel is just stable at at (a∗, a∗). Suppose that firm 1
defects to some a˜ < a∗. We will first establish that at locations (a˜, a∗), a cartel with full
collusion is stable. From the proof of Theorem 2 we then immediately have the result.
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For cartel stability to be satisfied for firm 1, we need
πk1 (a˜, a
∗)− (1− δ)πd1 (a˜, a∗) ≥ δπc2 (a˜, a∗) . (25)
Regardless of the case we are in, firm 1 profits with full collusion can be written πk1 =
(pm1 − c) y, with y the market share of firm 1. We then have
dπk1
da1













+ 2t (1− a1) .




πk1 (a1, a2)− (1− δ)πd1 (a1, a2)
¢
= (pm1 − c)
dy
da1
− 2t (a1 (3− δ)− (1− δ)) .






− p2 − p1
2t (1− a1 − a2)
+
1− a1







2t (1− a1 − a2)
+
1− a1





(1 + a22 − a21) + (1− 2a1)
2 (1− a1 − a2)




> 2t (a1 (3− δ)− (1− δ))
or ¡
v − ta21 − c
¢ dy
da1
> 2t (a1 (3− δ)− (1− δ)) .
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For the inequality to hold, it is thus suﬃcient to have
¡
v − ta21 − c
¢µ(1 + a22 − a21) + (1− 2a1)
2 (1− a1 − a2)
¶








a22 − a21 − 2a1 + 2
¢ ¡




−4δa1 + 12a1 + 4δ + a21 − 8
¢
(1− a2 − a1) .
The lhs is decreasing in a1 and increasing in a2. Within area I, the smallest value it can






. We then have that the lhs equals at least
13
16
(v − ta21 − c) . Similarly, it can be shown that the rhs is increasing in a1. The highest
value it can reach is if a1 =
1
2













with v > c+ 4t, the lhs is always larger than the rhs, which establishes that the lhs of 25
is increasing in a1. We already have that the rhs is decreasing in a1. That implies that an
increase in a1 makes the inequality stricter. But that implies that a decrease in a1 relaxes
the inequality. Thus, at a∗, when firm 1 defects to some a˜ < a∗, its condition for cartel
stability is still satisfied. The proof for case II goes along the exact same lines.
For firm 2, cartel stability requires that (24) is satisfied. We established in the proof
of the previous lemma that, given prices (p∗, p∗), an increase in a1 decreases the lhs, and
increases the rhs. Hence, a decrease in a1 weakens the inequality. Thus for firm 2, the
agreement (p∗, p∗) is stable at the new locations. But at the new locations, pm1 will only
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increase, which further relaxes firm 2’s cartel stability condition. Hence, full collusion
yields a stable cartel at the new locations. This establishes the result.
Combining these lemmas establishes theorem 3.
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Figure 1.  
Feasible location choices and corresponding areas for joint profit maximization 
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